


















Financial dollarization has been placed at the forefront of the policy debate in many 
developing economies, for reasons that include its influence on inflation performance 
and, most prominently, the currency imbalance and associated financial fragility that it 
introduces for the economy as a whole. This paper contributes to this debate by 
revisiting the evidence on the impact of FD on inflation, financial fragility and   
economic performance in light of a new updated database. It finds evidence that 
financially dollarized economies tend to display higher inflation rates, higher 
propensity to suffer banking crises and slower and more volatile output growth, 
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I. Introduction 
 
As defined in Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003), financial dollarization simply denotes an 
empirical observation: the holding by residents  of foreign currency-denominated 
assets and liabilities, including bank deposits and loans as well as non-bank assets 
such as commercial paper or sovereign debt.
2 The descriptive nature of this definition 
implicitly recognizes that the presence of FD is merely a symptom of a weak currency 
problem (namely, the rejection of the local currency as store value) for which the 
literature has already advanced and tested a number of alternative explanations.
3  
 
However, regardless of the underlying causes, the presence of financial 
dollarization has been increasingly seen both in academic and policy circles as a 
source of concern due to its potential implications in terms of monetary instability, 
financial fragility and overall economic performance. The purpose of this paper is to 
evaluate empirically whether and to what extent these implications are verified in the 
data. 
 
There are many reasons why financial dollarization has been placed at the 
forefront of the policy debate. First, inasmuch as financial dollarization influences the 
pricing behavior of firms and individuals, dollarized economies are induced to limit 
wide fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate due to their deleterious impact on 
inflation performance. As Chang and Velasco (2000) point out, “any scheme to 
control the rate of inflation at a short horizon must control, to some extent, the 
nominal exchange rate.” Moreover, financially dollarized economies may exhibit a 
more elastic price response to monetary shocks as onshore dollar assets are more 
readily available as a safe haven against inflation. 
 
More  recently, the financial dollarization debate has centered around the 
incidence of the associated currency mismatch. In this regard, while some 
dollarization may be required by producers of tradables as a hedge against exchange 
rate risk, widespread financial dollarization inevitably introduces a currency mismatch 
for the economy as a whole (either at the domestic banks’ balance sheets through local 
currency on-lending of foreign currency funds, or through real exchange rate exposure 
of dollar borrowers with income largely denominated in non-tradables as in the case of 
most local producers or the public sector). This mismatch, and the resulting real 
exchange rate exposure, amplifies the impact of real shocks through its negative effect 
                                                 
2 In what follows, following what has become standard in the dollarization literature, dollar and foreign 
currency, and peso and local currency are used interchangeably. 
3 Existing explanations point at portfolio hedging considerations (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003), time 
inconsistency problems related to the temptation to dillute local currency obligations through inflation 
(Calvo and Guidotti, 1989), the incidence of implicit debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001), 
currency-blind financial regulation (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2003) and signaling problems (De la Torre 
et al., 2003), among others. See De Nicoló et al. (2003) and Levy Yeyati (2003) for a discussion and 
empirical testing of some of these hypotheses.   
on debtors’ balance sheets, possibly leading to financial fragility, a concern that has 
been flagged by most of the recent currency and financial crises.
4  
 
On the other hand, inasmuch as this currency imbalance and the associated 
sensitivity to large real devaluations conditions the willingness of the monetary 
authorities to use the exchange rate as a shock absorber,
5
 the authorities’ unwillingness 
to let the real exchange rate fluctuate may feed back into financial dollarization, as 
dollar debtors anticipate either a stable real exchange rate or, if this strategy becomes 
unsustainable, a government bail out.
6 Finally, this RER exposure may explain the 
procyclical pattern of international capital flows to developing economies, as negative 
real shocks that tend to depreciate the local currency increase the leverage ratio of 
debtors in a financially dollarized country amplifying the effect of the cycle on the 
debtor’s capacity to pay.
7  
 
The vast body of analytical literature on financial dollarization and currency 
mismatches spurred by the recent episodes of financial distress contrasts with the 
scarcity of empirical work to support or refute the concerns previously discussed.
8 To 
contribute to fill this gap, this papers exploits an comprehensive database on 
alternative sources of financial dollarization to examine its impact on monetary 
stability, financial fragility and economic performance. 
 
The definition and measurement of financial dollarization used in this paper 
already entails taking sides on an issue that is certainly far from settled issue, as 
witnesses the discussion in Eichengreen et al. (2003), and Goldstein (2003). In 
particular, part of the literature on currency mismatches have focused on the country’s 
foreign currency indebtedness vis a vis non-residents, in the view that foreign assets 
and liabilities held domestically should cancel each other out, with no impact on 
economic performance. This focus, however, suffers from at least two important 
shortcomings. First, markets and holder residence tend to overlap, making the 
                                                 
4 See, among others, Krugman (1999), Aghion et al. (2000) and Céspedes et al. (2002). De la Torre et 
al. discuss the crucial role played by impending balance sheet effects in the recent Argentine crisis. 
5 This argument has been proposed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), among others, to account for “fear of 
floating,” that is, the tendency to avoid substantial exchange rate volatility through foreign exchange 
intervention under formally floating exchange rate regimes. In line with this hypothesis, Levy Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2003) find that financially dollarized countries tend to adopt de facto a more rigid 
exchange rate regime. It has to be noted, however, that if prices are nominally flexible, the real 
exchange rate adjustment to external shocks should materialize through deflation over a longer period 
of time, to the same qualitative effect. Empirical evidence on a deflationary adjustment under a peg is 
presented in Galiani et al. (2003). 
6 See Burnside et al. (2001). Indeed, this implicit guarantee has been at least partially validated in many 
recent crises (Mexico 1994 and Brazil 1998). Certainly, the forcible pesification of debts in Argentina 
after the collapse of the currency board agreement was an extreme case in which these beliefs were ex-
post fully confirmed. 
7 By contrast, in non-dollarized economies, the adjustment to a more depreciated equilibrium RER that 
comes through nominal depreciation typically improves (via debt dilution) the debtor’s capacity to pay 
relative. 
8 Exceptions include De Nicoló et al. (2003), Arteta (2002), and Calvo et al. (2003).  
distinction between residents and foreigners almost impossible to trace given the 
available data, particularly for those developing economies for which financial 
dollarization represents a potential concern. 
 
More importantly, even if the required data were available, the aggregation 
argument does not tend to materialize in practice. While a financially dollarized 
economy may be currency-balanced as a whole, it will likely be imbalanced at a micro 
level, as resident holders of financial assets typically differ from foreign currency 
debtors. In turn, at the time of a real exchange rate adjustment, individual mismatches, 
rather than netting out, tend to lead to capital flight, bank runs, massive bankruptcies 




Finally, there is mounting evidence that the overall degree of financial 
dollarization may be influenced by a home currency bias by which the currency 
composition of residents and non-residents differs, with the former more prone to 
invest in local currency assets than the latter.
10 As a result, it suggests that the overall 
currency mismatch, to the extent that it is correlated with the dependence on foreign 
borrowing, is associated with the inability to induce residents to hold local currency 




The route map of the paper is the following. Section II addresses the 
measurement problem, and presents an overview of levels and trends of alternative 
measures of FD in recent years. Section III reports the empirical tests of the 
consequences of financial dollarization. Finally, Section IV summarizes the main 
policy implications and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Indeed, even in those cases in which individual debtors are currency hedged, it is easy to conceive the 
case in which they file for bankruptcy after diverting their foreign currency assets right before the 
currency collapse. Following standard conventions, by external I refer to an obligation issued under 
international (as opposed to domestic) Law. Thus, debt issued under New York Law would be domestic 
if the issuer is a U.S. resident and external otherwise, irrespective of the nationality of the holder. 
10 The point is made analytically Thomas (1983) and Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003). Bordo et al. (2002) 
discusses it from a historical perspective. In a related paper, Claessens et al. (2003) find that the 
dollarization ratio of (internal plus external) government bonds is negatively related with the size of the 
domestic financial market. 
11 This contrasts with the related literature on “original sin,” which denotes the inability to borrow in 
domestic currency internationally (see Eichengreen et al., 2003, and references therein). It has to be 
noted, though, that there is no prima facie evidence supporting the view that original sin reflects 
inability to issue local currency bonds (as opposed to unwillingness to incur the cost of a high currency 
premia).  
II. FD in the data 
 
Measurement is certainly a non-trivial aspect in the financial dollarization debate, at 
least for two reasons. Firstly, the particular issue under study would tend to favor one 
particular aspect of dollarization (and, in turn, one particular measure) over the others. 
Thus, while the impact of financial dollarization on monetary stability requires a good 
measure of the dollar share of residents’ savings (for example, the deposit 
dollarization ratio), the influence of dollarization on financial fragility and crisis 
propensity calls for a measure of the liability dollarization ratio of domestic financial 
institutions. Finally, the impact on output volatility and growth, inasmuch as it is 
related to the real exchange rate exposure of the economy as a whole, is more likely to 
depend on total (internal and external, private and public) dollar indebtedness. 
 
Secondly, the choice of a measure depends crucially on data availability, in 
terms of both country and period coverage. A substantial amount of data is already 
available on the currency composition of domestic deposits, and the latter can be used 
as a reasonable proxy for domestic loan dollarization, as they often mirror each other 
due to the presence of prudential limits on banks’ foreign exchange positions (Figure 
1). The same is valid for dollarized official credit and, to varying degrees, to cross-
border deposits and loans (possibly biased downward due to underreporting) and 
external bonded debt. On the other extreme, data on the dollar share of domestic debt 
is rather difficult to produce.
12  
 
In light of the aforementioned constraints, and in order to maximize sample 
size, in the following empirical exercises I will focus primarily on the onshore deposit 
dollarization ratio as the main dollarization measure. The deposit dollarization series 
used here is constructed by assembling data reported in De Nicoló et al. (2003), Arteta 
(2002), Baliño et al. (1998), various central bank bulletins and IMF Article IV Staff 
Reports. As a result, the final series covers over 1524 observations for 122 developed 
and developing countries over the period 1975-2002.
 13 
 
Table 1.a provides a quick glance at the order of magnitude of the deposit 
dollarization levels and trends. As the table indicates, the average dollar share of 
domestic deposits increased from 20% in 1990 to 30% in 2001. Comparable trends are 
                                                 
12 Reinhart et al. (2003) construct a dollarization index based on the dollarization ratios of domestic 
deposits, external debt and domestic public debt. However, as they state in the appendix, available data 
on the latter covers only 24 countries. Classens et al. (2003), computing the dollarization of government 
debt from BIS sources, assume that all domestic debt is denominated in local currency (with the 
exception of Argentina for which they have an alternative source) anbstracting from the fact that 
governments in many financially dollarized countries issue domestic dollar (or dollar-linked) debt. 
13 Data reported in those sources has been cheked for consistency and, in many casse, revised 
accordingly. For testing purposes, I exclude de jure dollarized economies, in line with the view that 
micro mismatches are as important, if not more important than aggregate mismatches. Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents a list of countries and periods covered. A list of variable definitions and sources is 
presented in Table A2. For ease of comparison, Table 1 was prepared over a consistent sample of 
countries for which GDP and inflation data are available for the whole period.   
apparent for transition and Latin American economies where financial dollarization 
has been particularly pervasive.
14 As has been already well documented in the 
literature, deposit dollarization in emerging economies grew or remained relatively 
stable in most developing countries despite a marked decline in inflation rates across 
the board during the last decade. 
 
Table 1.b. illustrates the relative importance of deposit dollarization, 
normalized by the country’s GDP as a way of capturing the associated currency 
exposure, by comparing it with other alternative sources of financial dollarization: i) 
official (bilateral and multilateral) lending, ii) cross-border bank loans to local 
residents, and iii) external (private and public) bonded debt.
15 The sample includes 
developing countries for which data on all sources are available, and excludes offshore 
financial centers, where financial dollarization is typically large and of a different 
nature that the one studied here.  
 
As noted, the use of onshore deposit dollarization is a natural way to test the 
impact on monetary policy and, to the extent that it proxies onshore loan dollarization, 
to assess the consequences in terms of financial fragility. However, alternative 
measures of financial dollarization will be used as a robustness check in those cases in 
which that are likely to play a crucial role. 
 
 
III. Evaluating the consequences 
 
Dollarization and monetary policy 
 
The earlier literature stressed the fact that dollarization, by reducing the costs of 
switching to the foreign currency to avoid the effects of inflation, may increase the 
volatility of money demand impinging in the capacity of the central bank to conduct 
monetary policy. While this concern was rooted in the view of dollarization as a 
currency substitution phenomenon, a similar argument could be made regarding the 
dollarization of domestic savings. Specifically, as the flight to readily available 
foreign-currency assets becomes less costly, the demand for reserve money should be 
more sensitive to monetary expansions in a dollarized economy. On the positive side, 
financial dollarization may reduce the temptation to inflate and be conducive, ceteris 
                                                 
14 Dollarization ratios in transition economies are computed over a shorter period. As a result of the 
associated real exchange rate appreciation that followed price liberalization in these countries, initial 
ratios may overstate the long run dollarization levels. On the impact of the real exchange rate variations 
on dollarization ratios, see Baliño et al. (1999). 
15 The data is from the Bank of International Settlements, with exception of official credit, sourced from 
the World Bank´s GDF. While no information on the currency of denomination of cross-border deposits 
and loans is provided, it is reasonable to assume, as I do here, that in the case of developing economies 
they are foreign denominated. Appendix B presents tables with country and period coverage for all 
dollarization series. Appendix C reports a list of variable definition and sources used in the paper.  
paribus, to lower inflation expectations, as it increases the perceived cost of monetary 
expansions both in terms of inflation and due to balance sheet concerns. 
 
To address these hypotheses, I test a simple specification based on the log 
linearization of a standard money demand equation. Specifically, I regress the log 
difference of the consumer price on the log differences in broad money (M2) and real 
GDP, and the change in the nominal interest rate, plus three regional dummies 
corresponding to Latin American (latam), sub-Saharan African (safrica) and transition 
economies (trans), and year dummies.
16 To this I add the deposit dollarization ratio 
and its interaction with money growth. If financial dollarization induce lower inflation 
expectations, the total effect of deposit dollarization should be negative. In turn, a 
greater sensitivity of inflation to money growth should be captured by a positive 
interaction coefficient. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 3 confirm our priors, indicating that dollarization 
has a beneficial short-run effect on inflation through a sobering effect on expectations, 
at the expense of a greater sensitivity of inflation to changes in the monetary 
aggregate. The first columns presents the baseline specification, controlling for 
country-specific effects. The coefficients display the correct sign (positive for money 
growth and interest rates, negative for output growth). Column (2) shows an OLS 
regression on the average dollarization ratio and its interaction with money.
17 The 
dollarization coefficient has the expected negative sign (more dollarization leading to 
less inflation), although it is not significant. On the other hand, the interaction reveals 
that onshore dollarization raises significantly the elasticity of inflation with respect to 
money growth. As an indicative example, a 100% deposit dollarization level implies 
that the coefficient on money creation nearly doubles. Comparable results are obtained 
using country-specific effects (column 3).  The coefficient on deposit dollarization 
becomes significant when we replicate the previous two regressions using the current 
dollarization ratio instead of its average (columns 4 and 5). Reassuringly, the rest of 
the coefficients are virtually unchanged.  
 
The implications of these two offsetting effects (namely, a lower inflation bias 
countervailing a higher inflation sensitivity) for long-run inflation rate are not 
straightforward. To address this question, we run a cross-section regression of average 
inflation on the average GDP and money growth rates and the average dollarization 
level (column 6). The coefficient shows up positive but not significant. A positive link 
between dollarization and inflation, however, presents obvious endogeneity concerns 
(as higher inflation may lead to higher deposit dollarization). To mitigate this 
problems, we instrument dollarization using an index of the degree of restrictions to 
onshore dollarization, in place as of 2000 (restrictions), constructed following De 
                                                 
16 The inclusion of additional variables such as openness, government consumption or exchange rate 
regimes yield similar results at the cost of a loss of observations, and are thus ommited. Results are 
available upon request. 
17 Regional dummies are also introduced and display the expected positive sign.  
Nicoló et al. (2003).
18 The results show a positive and significant association between 
dollarization and inflation, suggesting that the short-run effect in terms of inflation 
expectations is ultimately offset by the incidence of a more sensitive inflation 
response.  
 
Dollarization and financial fragility 
 
Perhaps the concern more frequently emphasized in relation to financial dollarization 
is its deleterious impact on financial fragility. Recent work have reported some 
supporting evidence. On the one hand, De Nicoló et al. (2003) find that dollarized 
banking sectors exhibit higher risk profiles (as measured by the Z-index, a proxy of 
distance to default)
19 and deposit volatility (in line with the greater volatility of money 
demand revealed in the previous section). Calvo et al. (2003), in related work, 
document that the propensity to suffer sudden stops in capital inflows (possibly an 
important trigger of financial crises) increases with the degree of financial 
dollarization (defined as BIS reporting banks’ local asset positions in foreign currency 
as a share of GDP).  
 
Closer to the focus of this paper, Domac and Martínez Pería (2000) find the 
foreign liabilities to assets ratio of local banks to be positively correlated with the 
probability of a systemic banking crisis. This is at odds, however, with Arteta (2003), 
who find, for a somewhat smaller sample, little evidence that onshore financial 
dollarization raises the probability of facing a banking crisis. Thus, it appears that one 
the main themes of the financial dollarization debate, namely its presumed incidence 
on financial fragility and crisis propensity due to the presence of balance sheet effects, 
it still to be validated by the evidence. 
 
I revisit this issue by modeling the probability of facing a banking crisis as a 
function of standard crisis determinants (lagged to limit potential endogeneity 
problems), the change in the nominal exchange rate in the previous period, and two 
financial dollarization measures: a deposit dollarization dummy (which equals 1 
whenever the deposit dollarization ratio for the previous year exceeds 10%), and the 
ratio between local banks´ foreign currency liabilities and assets, to capture non-
deposit liability dollarization of local banks. 
                                                 
18 While the index of restrictions corresponds to the year 2000, it can be reasonably assumed that the 
degree of restrictiveness in individual countries is relatively constant over time. Indeed, the index 
exhibits a high and statistically significant correlation with annual dollarization ratios in different years. 
On the other hand, it is not correlated with inflation in any of the specifications in the table. The index, 
based on the IMF’s AREAER, is reported in Appendix B. See De Nicoló et al. (2003) for a description. 
19 More precisely, the index measures the probability that a loss (negative ROA) exceeds the bank’s 




















Thus, a smaller Z would indicate a larger risk exposure.  
 
Specifically, I use as dependent variable a dummy that equals one for the first 
period of the crisis, and zero in non-crisis periods. Crisis periods following the first 
one are dropped from the sample to abstract from any impact that the crisis may have 
on the explanatory variables. In turn, the set of standard controls comprises the 
inflation rate, changes in the terms of trade, the real interest rate, the real GDP growth 
rate, and the ratios of M2 to international reserves, private credit to GDP, liquid to 
total assets, and capital flows to GDP. In addition, I add the real GDP per capita as a 
broad control for institutional quality. Finally, to test whether financial dollarization 
increases the propensity of a crisis for a given exchange rate adjustment, some 
regressions include the interaction of the change in the exchange rate with the 
financial dollarization measures. 
 
The results are reported in Table 5. The first column includes only the standard 
regressors. All display the expected sign although only a few are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, possibly due to multicolinearity problems. Column 
2 introduces the change in the exchange rate and the dollarization variables, which 
show a positive and, in the case of the latter, significant effect on crisis propensity. 
Finally, column 3 adds the interaction terms. As can be seen, both interactions are 
positive and significant, indicating that onshore dollarization increases the incidence 
of exchange rate changes in the probability of suffering a banking crisis. The total 
effect of each dollarization measure, positive and significant as expected, are reported 
at the bottom. 
 
As the table shows, the number of observations is reduced substantially when 
al regressors are included. To check whether the results are sensitive to the small 
sample covered in columns 2 and 3, columns 4 and 5 simply replicate these tests using 
a subsample of the set of standard controls. The qualitative results are not altered. 
Interestingly, in both cases, the total effect of an exchange rate change is not 
significant once the dollarization variables are included, suggesting that an exchange 
rate shock appears to have a negative impact only through its balance sheet effect.
20  
 
The previous results substantiate the concern linking financial dollarization 
with financial fragility through the balance sheet channel. Dollarization advocates, 
however, has often stressed that this undesired consequence should be weighted 
against the beneficial effects of onshore dollarization on local intermediation, in 
countries where financial markets would otherwise be insufficiently developed due to 
a weak currency problem. A final answer to the question about whether financial 
dollarization helps develop domestic markets in weak currency economies remains 
elusive, as empirical testing is mined by the scarcity of data and the difficulty to 
                                                 
20 In fact, its sign turns negative, suggesting that banking sectors in non-dollarized economies actually 
may benefit from an exchange rate adjustment, possibly due to its positive impact on the real economy. 
Unfortunately, the coefficients are not significant and more testing is needed to assess whether this 
positive effect is actually in place.  
control for all relevant factors that may influence both currency denomination and 
financial development. 
 
However, a recent study by De Nicoló et al. (2003) provides some valuable 
preliminary insights. By regressing financial depth (measured as the M2 to GDP ratio) 
on the deposit dollarization ratio plus a number of additional controls, they find that 
dollarization is not associated per se with deeper markets, except in high inflation 
countries where it appears to have a countervailing effect.
21 In addition, it shows that 
the imposition of restrictions on onshore dollarization has no effect on the degree of 
financial depth, which suggest that the desintermediation effects of limiting 
dollarization de jure may have been overstated in the debate.  
 
A cursory look at the data seems to reveal a negative dollarization-financial 
depth link, as shown in Figure 2, where I plotted average M2-to-GDP and 
dollarization ratios. Offshore centers are singled out in the figure by a square marker. 
As can be seen, three of them are clear outliers relative to what appears to be a 
significant negative association. Once offshore centers are excluded from the sample, 
a simple regression of financial depth on deposit dollarization yields a significant and 
negative correlation. 
 
In sum, while concerns related to financial fragility seem to be supported by 
the evidence, there seems to be little empirical ground for the foregone conclusion that 
dollarized countries are compensated with the benefit of more liquid domestic 
financial markets. 
 
Dollarization and growth 
 
Although the final test of the net effect of financial dollarization lies in its implication 
for growth and output volatility, there are surprisingly few empirical studies that 
systematically addresses this issue.
22 Regarding output volatility, the increased real 
exchange exposure typically associated with dollarization would indicate that 
dollarized countries are likely to exhibit greater output variability. Moreover, one 
could argue that, because they are known to be more sensitive to currency fluctuations, 
dollarized countries are bound to be the subject of speculative attacks, endogenizing to 
some extent the distribution of external shocks.
23  
 
Less straightforward is the case for long-run growth. While output volatility 
may have adverse consequences for growth (Ramsey and Ramsey, 1995), 
                                                 
21 Similar results are based using the present database. 
22 The only exception is, perhaps, Reinhart et al. (2003) where they compare average growth 
performance as a function of different measures of dollarization, with mixed results. 
23 This hypothesis can be thought of an extension Calvo´s (1999) claim that pegs are likely to suffer 
more volatile external shocks due to speculative attacks, to the case of a dollarized economy where the 
government is expected to mitigate the depreciation of the local currency at the cost of a loss of 
reserves.   
dollarization, by deepening financial markets, may fuel investment offsetting the 
previous effect. However, as we have seen, the alleged financial impact does not show 
in the data, tilting the balance against dollarization.  
 
A cursory look at the data yields interesting preliminary insights. Table 7a 
reports the means test of the two variables of interest (growth and growth volatility) 
for high a low dollarization countries, defined as those with average dollar ratios 
above or below the sample median. As can be seen, the latter display significantly 
faster and more stable growth than the former. Similar conclusions can be drawn from 
the correlations in Table 7b. Thus, a bird’s eye look at the data appears to indicate that 
dollarization does have negative implications for growth. 
 
This is consistent with the results of the cross-section regressions of Tables 7c-
d. The first table reports growth regressions of average growth on the average 
dollarization ratio and standard controls such as initial per capita GDP, initial human 
capital (proxied by the ration of secondary school enrollment at the beginning of the 
period, sec), plus the averages of the investment-to-GDP ratio, the population growth, 
and regional dummies. The table indicates that dollarization is negatively associated 
with growth, and significantly so when offshore economies are excluded. 
Instrumenting dollarization with restrictions reinforces the results. The results 
concerning output volatility are even more robust (Table 7d). Dollarization is 
significantly related with volatility, even after controlling for terms of trade and 
nominal exchange rate volatility (column 4) and excluding offshore financial centers 
(column 5). 
 
The literature on the real consequences of financial dollarization has 
emphasized the incidence of the aggregate currency mismatch, focusing on external 
foreign currency liabilities. While this does not deny the relevance of onshore 
dollarization as a source of financial distress, offshore dollarization certainly played a 
role in recent financial crises and helps explain the deleterious effects of exchange rate 
adjustments on economies where onshore dollarization is virtually null. More 
generally, we would expect to observe a negative link between measures of offshore 
dollarization and output volatility, particularly in developing economies. This link is 
explored in the last three columns in Table 7, where we replicate the previous tests 
using the ratio of foreign bonded debt (private and public) over GDP as a proxy for the 
external mismatch. As can be seen, output volatility appears to be positively and 
significantly correlated with the level of foreign currency bonded debt for non-
industrial economies (but not for industrial ones), even after controlling for nominal 
instability over the period (proxied by average inflation) and the degree of openness.
24 
 
These findings suggest that dollarization (both domestic and external) may 
have a detrimental effect on the real economy. While a more careful exploration of 
these links that takes into account potential simultaneity problems is warranted, this 
                                                 
  
preliminary exploration support the view that, for a dollarized developing economy, 
the growth path is likely to be slower and choppier than for the rest. 
 
 
IV. Final remarks 
 
The previous section showed that financially dollarized economies tend to display a 
greater sensitivity of domestic prices to money creation and higher inflation rates 
(contradicting the view of dollarization as a self-disciplining device), a greater 
propensity to suffer systemic banking crises, and slower and more volatile output 
growth, without any visible gain in terms of financial depth. In sum, the evidence 
confirmed some of the concerns typically associated with financial dollarization, and 
cast doubt on certain arguments that have been used in its favor.  
 
Overall, these findings provide a case for promoting dedollarization as an 
active policy. Both the previous evidence and the lessons from past and current 
dedollarization experiences suggest that any such strategy should entail a two-way 
approach.
25 On the one hand, short of a quantitative limit on onshore dollar 
intermediation (as is the case in many developed and emerging economies), prudential 
regulation should be revised to address ex-ante the factors that favor the use of the 
dollar, as is gradually being done, rather belatedly, by some financially dollarized 
economies such as Argentina and Uruguay after recent systemic financial crises.
26 On 
the other, pari passu with this revisions, peso instruments should be the introduced 
and promoted to limit the impact of more stringent regulation in terms of domestic 
financial intermediation, either through the use of indexation as in Chile or more 
naturally through the development of local currency markets for government debt as a 
substitute for foreign currency-denominated external obligations, as has been done, for 
example, in Mexico after the Tequila crisis. 
 
Needless to say, any successful dedollarization strategy should be accompanied 
by sound and credible monetary and fiscal policies. However, as witness the Argentine 
convertibility, the Uruguayan crawling peg or the Peruvian managed float, sound 
monetary policies are necessary but may not be sufficient. A proactive agenda with 
specific measures aimed at mitigating the presence of externalities and enhancing the 
attractiveness of local currency assets may be needed to complement conducive macro 
policies. Ultimately, the economic implications of financial dollarization appear to 
justify the effort. 
                                                 
25 See Levy Yeyati (2003) for a detailed discussion along these lines. 
26 Measures along these lines include, for example, equalizing the local currency coverage of deposit 
insurance across currencies or factoring in the currency exposure of debtors in the computation of 
provisions and risk-based capital requirements.  
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Table 1a. Deposit Dollarization and Inflation 
 
   Latam  Transition 
  
Dollarization Inflation
Dollarization Inflation Dollarization Inflation




median  15.6 15.0 13.3 17.4 30.0 24.8 
Obs.    45 45 21 21 12 12 
mean  30.4 8.9 28.9 5.0 47.7 7.2 
2001 
median  20.1 4.0 18.9 4.0 48.0 7.1 
Obs.    71 71 22 22 15 15 




Table 1b. Dollar liabilities over GDP: Alternative Sources 
(non-industrial counteies excluding offshore financial centers) 
 







term debt  Total
* 
mean 6.98  14.55  3.74  16.51  41.80 
1995 
median 5.56  11.39  1.79  11.81  39.82 
Obs.    26 26  26  26  26 
min    0 2.46 0.16  0  11.97 
max    25.53 53.81  35.02  75.80  111.42 
mean 9.93  12.62  8.28  13.051  43.88 
2000 
median 8.41  10.90  6.44  11.11  41.31 
Obs.    29 29  29  29  29 
min    0.01 2.72  0.57  0  17.26 
max    37.61 25.44  25.75  41.56  80.64 
 
* Sum of the GDP ratios of dollarization of domestic deposits, cross border loans, external 
bonded debt, and official credit. 
Note: Excludes outliers: Guyana, Nicaragua and Sao Tome & Principe.  
Table 2. Dollarization and Inflation 
Dependent Variable: ∆p 
 
  FE OLS FE OLS FE  Avg Avg(i) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
∆m  0.841*** 0.676*** 0.515*** 0.703*** 0.579***     
  (0.065) (0.087) (0.119) (0.132) (0.150)     
∆lgdp  -0.448*** -0.698*** -0.597*** -0.627***  -0.502**     
  (0.114) (0.129) (0.132) (0.199) (0.202)     
∆intrate  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
latam  0.000  0.025*   0.015   0.021  0.025 
  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.013)   (0.016)  (0.019) 
safrica 0.000  0.045***    0.046*    0.054**  0.057** 
  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.027)   (0.024)  (0.025) 
transition  0.000  0.075***   0.060**   0.076 0.056 
  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.023)   (0.054)  (0.057) 
dollar_avg    -0.086      0.081  0.190** 
    (0.052)      (0.079)  (0.094) 
∆m_dollar_avg   0.599***  0.899***        
   (0.202)  (0.282)         
dollar       -0.161**  -0.566***     
       (0.076)  (0.181)     
∆m_dollar      0.683**  0.938**     
       (0.326)  (0.380)     
∆m_avg        0.947***  0.899*** 
        (0.090)  (0.102) 
∆lgdp_avg        -1.431**  -1.526** 
        (0.673)  (0.690) 
constant -0.040**  -0.036**  -0.019 -0.025 0.055  -0.018  -0.027 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.063) (0.092)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
Observations  2987 2056 2056 1076 1076  105  103 
R-squared 0.81  0.80  0.83 0.85 0.87  0.83  0.83 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and, in fixed-eefect specifications, to clustering by country-specific observations, 
in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       




Selected Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
dlcpi 2056  0.167  0.357  -0.103  5.475 
dollar_avg  2056 0.173 0.180 0.001 0.915 
dlm2_dollar_avg 2056  0.052  0.156  -0.514  2.591 
dollar  1076 0.215 0.226 0.000 0.941 
dlm2_dollar 1076  0.070  0.190  -0.406  2.538  
Table 3. Dollarization and financial fragility 
Dependent variable: First crisis year dummy 
 
  Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆p  0.553*** -0.841  -1.673     
  (0.201) (0.716) (1.089)     
∆tt  -0.000 0.011 0.013     
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)     
real interest rate  -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
M2/reserves  -0.010 -0.004 -0.005     
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)     
privcred/gdp  0.027 -0.597 -0.802     
  (0.657) (1.142) (1.168)     
cash/assets  -0.530 -0.568 -0.588     
  (0.692) (0.963) (0.884)     
capital flows/gdp  -1.114 -1.062 -1.651     
  (1.017) (1.422) (1.429)     
real gdp growth  -0.014 -0.000 -0.006  -0.041*  -0.047* 
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.025) 
real per capita gdp   0.000** 0.000* 0.000**  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆er    1.113  -0.895 0.489*** -1.309 
   (0.679)  (1.326)  (0.184)  (1.004) 
FL/FA    0.000*** 0.005** 0.000*** 0.004** 
   (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
dollar_10   0.852**  0.683*  0.881***  0.787** 
   (0.369)  (0.411)  (0.340)  (0.357) 
FL/FA * ∆er     0.106**  0.075** 
     (0.051)    (0.034) 
dollar_10 * ∆er     2.351**    1.653* 
     (1.196)    (0.980) 
constant  -2.696*** -2.921*** -2.606*** -3.624*** -3.523*** 
  (0.356) (0.551) (0.544) (0.310) (0.325) 
Observations  1429 535  535 1041  1041 
∆er + FL/FA*∆er + dollar_10*∆er     1.660    0.880 
(p-value)     (0.175)    (0.326) 
dollar_10 + dollar_10 * ∆er     1.099***    1.030*** 
(p-value)     (0.005)    (0.004) 
FL/FA + FL/FA_∆er     0.024**  0.015** 
(p-value)     (0.039)    (0.024) 
Notes: All regressors lagged one period. The crisis dummy equals one for the first year of a banking crisis. 
Subsequent crisis years dropped from the sample. dollar_10 equals one if onshore deposit dollarization ratio 
exceeds 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.       




Selected Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
∆er  535 .177011  .4827931  -.1407392  5.15798 
LF/LA  535  25.56345 401.1965 .0072505 8086.207 




Table 4a. Dollarization and growth: Mean tests 
 






Mean (∆gdp_avg)  0.035 0.026  -0.010 
 (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.000) 
Mean (∆gdp_sd)  0.042 0.065 0.023 
 (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.000) 
Number of countries  64  60   
 
Note: Low (high) dollarization countries are those with average dollarization ratios below (above) the 




















(0.0026)   




Table 5. Growth regressions 
Dependent Variable: ∆gdp_avg 
 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  (i)  IV  (i) 
       exc.  offshore  exc.  offshore 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial  gdppc  -0.004**  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
sec  0.009  0.014*  0.001 0.003 0.010 0.012 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
dollar_avg -0.014  -0.022*  -0.015 -0.021**  -0.054***  -0.064*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) 
invgdp_avg    0.201*** 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 
    (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.046) 
popg_avg   0.380***  0.300**  0.326**  0.514***  0.543*** 
    (0.120) (0.130) (0.129) (0.180) (0.186) 
latam     -0.009**  -0.008*  -0.004  -0.002 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
transition    -0.013***  -0.011**  -0.006  -0.003 
      (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
safrica     -0.015**  -0.014**  -0.011  -0.009 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
constant 0.036***  -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations  77 67 67 65 65 63 
R-squared 0.09  0.53  0.60 0.59 0.48 0.47 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
(i) Instruments:  gdppc74, sec, inggdp_avg, popg_avg, latam, transition, safrica, and restrictions. 




Selected Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
∆gdp_avg  77 0.033  0.017  -0.017  0.081 
Initial gdppc  77  1.260  1.648  0.019  9.828 
dollar_avg 77  0.173  0.167  0.001  0.756 
invgdp_avg 67  0.213  0.050  0.097  0.316 
popg_avg 67  0.020  0.014  -0.000  0.087  
Table 6. Output volatility regressions 
Dependent Variable: ∆gdp_sd 
 
  OLS OLS OLS  OLS  OLS OLS  OLS  OLS 
        exc.  offshore   non-industrials 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
dollar_avg  0.066*** 0.026**  0.024** 0.020**  0.020*      
  (0.021) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.011)      
Initial gdppc   0.009**  0.010**  0.007**  0.007*** 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
sec   -0.063***  -0.065***  -0.029** -0.035** -0.031** -0.041  -0.042 
   (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
latam     -0.001  -0.007  -0.010** 0.000 -0.003  -0.013 
     (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
transition     0.018**  0.011**  0.013*** 0.023*  0.000  0.000 
     (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.013)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
safrica     -0.002  -0.002  -0.005 -0.008  -0.002  -0.011 
     (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.014) 
∆tt_sd      0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*  0.001 
      (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
∆er_sd      -0.001  0.000 -0.005  -0.005  -0.016 
      (0.004)  (0.003) (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
doll_bondebt_ avg         0.003  0.257***  0.228**
         (0.013)  (0.091)  (0.098) 
inflation_avg             0.761 
             (0.471) 
Openness (nitial)             -0.005 
             (0.016) 
constant  0.038*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.022**  0.023** 0.038***  0.031**  0.035* 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
Observations  124 77  77 73  70 61  36  27 
R-squared  0.15 0.36 0.37  0.59  0.63 0.27  0.28  0.51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Selected Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
∆gdp_sd  124 0.053 0.036 0.015 0.264 
dollar_avg 124  0.234  0.209  0.001  0.915 
Initial gdppc  77  1.291  1.682  0.019  9.828 
sec 77  0.412  0.272  0.010  0.910 
doll_bondebt_ avg  61 0.120  0.188  0.000  1.260  
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Notes: Square markers represent offshore countries. The trendline represents the locus of the 
fitted values of a simple regression of the average M2-to-GDP ratio on the average deposit 
dollarization ratio, excluding offshore observations. The regression cofficient is -0.005 with a 
t-statistic of -5.27. 
Appendix  
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definitions  (sources) 
∆p  Logarithmic difference of the CPI. (IMF’s World Economic Outlook [WEO]) 
∆e 
Logarithmic difference of the nominal exchange rate (IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
[WEO]). 
restrictions  Index of restrictiveness of rules on resident holdings of foreign currency deposits 
onshore, revised and expanded from De Nicoló et al. (2003), using their methodology. 
sec  School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  (IBRD’s World Development Indicators 
[WDI]). 
∆m  Logarithmic difference of M2 (IFS). 
∆gdp  Logarithmic difference of real GDP (IFS). 
crisis  Dummy variable equal to one for the first crisis year (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003).  
real gdp growth  Percent variation of GDP in local currency at constant prices  (WDI). 
real per capita 
gdp  GDP per capita, constant prices in local currency  (WEO). 
M2 / GDP  Ratio of M2 over GDP (IFS). 
M2 / reserves  Ratio of M2 over international reserves (IFS). 
Cash/assets  Reserves of deposit money banks over assets of deposit money banks (IFS) 
privcred/GDP  Bank credit to the resident private sector over GDP (IFS) 
gdppc_us  GDP per capita denominated in US dollars (WEO). 
intrate  Nominal interest rate (IFS). 
dollar  Dollar deposits over total deposits in local deposit money banks (various sources). 
openness  (Export + Import) / GDP (IFS). 
∆tt 
Logarithmic difference of terms of trade (WDI: exports as a cpacity to import (constant 
LCU)). 
private 
credit/gdp  Credit growth/GDP  (IFS). 
cash / assets  Reserves of deposit money banks / assets of deposits money  (IFS). 
FL/FA  Deposit money banks´ foreign liabilities over foreign assets (IFS). 
capital 
flows/gdp  Capital account + financial account + net errors and omissions  (IFS). 
latam  Dummy variable for Latin American countries. 
transition  Dummy variable for transition countries. 
safrica  Dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
offshore  Dummy variable for offshore centers (BIS). 
Notes: x_avg and x_sd denote the mean and standard deviaton of x over the period covered. x_1 denotes the value of the 
variable x lagged one period.  
  
Table A2. Onshore deposit dollarization data: Countries and periods covered 
 
Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. 
Albania 1992-2001  Ecuador*  1990-2001  Lebanon 1993-2001  Sierra  Leone  1993-1999 
Angola 1995-2001  Egypt  1980-2001  Lithuania** 1993-2001  Slovak  Republic**  1991-2001 
Antigua and Barbuda*  1979-2001  El Salvador*  1982-2001 Macedonia,  FYR**  1997-2001 Slovenia**  1991-2001 
Argentina* 1986-2001  Estonia**  1991-2001  Malawi 1994-2001  South  Africa  1991-2001 
Armenia**  1992-2001 Ethiopia  1998-1999 Malaysia  1996-2001 Spain  1996-2001 
Austria 1997-2001  Finland  1996-1999  Maldives  1981-1999  St. Kitts and Nevis*  1979-2001 
Azerbaijan** 1992-2001  Georgia**  1992-2001 Malta  1975-1984 St.  Lucia*  1979-1999 
Bahamas, The  1975-2001  Ghana  1995-2000  Mauritius  1992-1999  St. Vincent & Grens.*  1979-2001 
Bangladesh 1987-2001  Greece  1990-2001  Mexico* 1991-2001  Sudan  1992-1998 
Bahrain 1984-1997  Grenada*  1979-1999  Moldova** 1994-2001  Suriname*  1975 
Barbados*  1975-2001 Guatemala*  1995-2001 Mongolia**  1992-2001 Sweden  1994-2001 
Belarus** 1992-2001  Guinea  1989-2001  Mozambique 1991-2001  Switzerland  1998-2001 
Belize 1976-2001  Guinea-Bissau  1990-1996  Myanmar  1991-1999  Syrian Arab Republic  1975-1998 
Bhutan 1993-2001  Haiti*  1994-2001  Netherlands 1990-2001  Tajikistan*  1996-2000 
Bolivia* 1975-2001  Honduras*  1990-2001 Netherlands  Antilles*  1975-2001 Tanzania  1993-2001 
Bosnia and Herzeg.**  1996-2001  Hong Kong  1991-2001 New  Zealand  1990-2001 Thailand  1982-2001 
Bulgaria** 1991-2001  Hungary** 1989-2001  Nicaragua*  1990-2001  Trinidad and Tobago  1993-2001 
Cape Verde  1995-1999  Iceland  1978-1999 Nigeria  1994-2001 Turkey  1986-2001 
Cambodia 1993-2001  Indonesia 1992-2001 Norway  1996-2000 Turkmenistan** 1993-2000 
Chile*  1976-2001 Israel  1981-2001 Oman  1975-1999 Tonga  1994-1999 
China,P.R.: Mainland  1998-2001  Italy  1996-2000 Pakistan  1990-1998 Uzbekistan  1997-1999 
Colombia*  1990-1999  Jamaica*  1992-2001  Papua New Guinea  1976-1999  Uganda  1992-2000 
Comoros 1998-2001  Japan  1996-2001  Paraguay* 1988-2001  Ukraine** 1992-2001 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1975-2001  Jordan  1990-1999  Peru*  1975-2001  United Arab Emirates  1981-2001 
Costa  Rica*  1990-2001 Kazakhstan**  1998-2001 Philippines  1982-2001 United  Kingdom  1990-2001 
Croatia** 1993-2001  Kenya  1995-2001  Poland** 1985-2001  Uruguay*  1981-2001 
Czech Republic**  1993-2001  Korea  1990-2001 Qatar  1993-1999 Vanuatu  1981-1999 
Cyprus 1991-1999  Kuwait 1981-1999  Romania** 1990-2001  Venezuela* 1994-2001 
Denmark 1991-2001  Kyrgyz  Republic**  1995-2001 Russia**  1993-2001 Vietnam  1992-2001 
Dominica*  1988-2001  Lao People's Dem. Rep.  1989-2001  Sao Tome & Principe  1995-2001  Yemen  1990-2001 
Dominican Republic  1996-2001  Latvia**  1992-2001 Saudi  Arabia  1975-2001 Zambia  1994-2001 
         Zimbabwe  1993-1999 
  Note: (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes Transition countries.  
Table A3. Cross-border loans: Countries and periods covered 
 
Country  Period 
covered 
  Country  Period 
covered 
  Country  Period 
covered 
Afghanistan  1995-2000   Ghana  1995-2002   Nigeria  1995-2002 
Albania**  1995-2002   Greece  1995-2002   Norway  1995-2002 
Algeria  1995-2002   Grenada*  1995-2002   Oman  1995-2002 
Angola  1995-2002   Guatemala*  1995-2002   Pakistan  1995-2002 
Argentina*  1995-2002   Guinea  1995-2002   Panama*  1995-2002 
Aruba*  1995-2002   Guinea-Bissau  1995-2002    Papua New Guinea  1995-2002 
Armenia**  1995-2002   Guyana*  1995-2002   Paraguay*  1995-2002 
Australia  1995-2002   Haiti*  1995-2002   Peru*  1995-2002 
Austria  1995-2002   Honduras*  1995-2002   Philippines  1995-2002 
Azerbaijan**  1995-2002   Hong  Kong  1995-2002   Poland**  1995-2002 
Bahamas, The*  1995-2002   Hungary**  1995-2002   Portugal  1995-2002 
Bahrain  1995-2002   Iceland  1995-2002   Qatar  1995-2002 
Bangladesh  1995-2002   India  1995-2002   Romania**  1995-2002 
Barbados*  1995-2002   Indonesia  1995-2002   Russia**  1995-2002 
Belarus**  1995-2002    Iran, I.R. of  1995-2002   Rwanda  1995-2002 
Belize*  1995-2002   Iraq  1995-2000   Saudi  Arabia  1995-2002 
Benin  1995-2002   Ireland  1995-2002    Sao Tome & Principe  1995-2002 
Bhutan  1995-2002   Israel  1995-2002   Senegal  1995-2002 
Bolivia*  1995-2002   Italy  1995-2002   Seychelles  1995-2002 
Bosnia and Herzegovina**  1995-2002   Jamaica*  1995-2002   Sierra  Leone  1995-2002 
Botswana  1995-2002   Japan  1995-2002   Singapore  1995-2002 
Brazil*  1995-2002   Jordan  1995-2002   Slovak  Republic**  1995-2002 
Bulgaria**  1995-2002   Kazakhstan**  1995-2002   Solomon  Islands  1995-2002 
Burkina Faso  1995-2002   Kenya  1995-2002   Somalia  1995-2002 
Burundi  1995-2002   Kiribati  1995-2002   South  Africa  1995-2002 
Cambodia  1995-2002   Kuwait  1995-2002   Spain  1995-2002 
Cameroon  1995-2002   Kyrgyz  Republic**  1995-2002   Sri  Lanka  1995-2002 
Cape Verde  1995-2002    Lao People's Dem. Rep  1995-2002   St.  Lucia*  1995-2002 
Central African Republic  1995-2002   Latvia**  1995-2002    St. Vincent & Grens.*  1995-2002 
Chad  1995-2002   Lebanon  1995-2002   Sudan  1995-2002 
Chile*  1995-2002   Lesotho  1995-2002   Swaziland  1995-2002 
China:  Mainland  1995-2002   Liberia  1995-2002   Sweden  1995-2002 
Colombia*  1995-2002   Libya  1995-2002   Switzerland  1995-2002 
Comoros  1995-2002   Lithuania**  1995-2002    Syrian Arab Republic  1995-2002 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   1995-2002   Luxembourg  1995-2002   Tajikistan**  1995-2002 
Congo, Republic of  1995-2002   Macedonia,  FYR**  1995-2002   Tanzania  1995-2002 
Costa Rica*  1995-2002   Madagascar  1995-2002   Thailand  1995-2002 
Cote D'Ivoire  1995-2002   Malawi  1995-2002   Togo  1995-2002 
Croatia**  1995-2002   Malaysia  1995-2002   Tonga  1995-2002 
Cyprus  1995-2002   Maldives  1995-2002    Trinidad & Tobago*  1995-2002 
Czech Republic**  1995-2002   Mali  1995-2002   Tunisia  1995-2002 
Djibouti  1995-2002   Malta  1995-2002   Turkey  1995-2002 
Dominica*  1995-2002   Mauritania  1995-2002   Turkmenistán**  1995-2002 
Dominican Republic*  1995-2002   Mauritius  1995-2002   Uganda  1995-2002 
Ecuador*  1995-2002   Mexico*  1995-2002   Ukraine**  1995-2002 
Egypt  1995-2002   Moldova**  1995-2002    United Arab Emirates  1995-2002 
El Salvador*  1995-2002   Mongolia**  1995-2002   United  Kingdom  1995-2002 
Equatorial Guinea  1995-2002   Morocco  1995-2002   United  States  1995-2002 
Estonia**  1995-2002   Mozambique  1995-2002   Uruguay*  1995-2002 
Ethiopia  1995-2002   Myanmar  1995-2002   Uzbekistán**  1995-2002 
Fiji  1995-2002   Namibia  1995-2002   Vanuatu  1995-2002 
Finland  1995-2002   Nepal  1995-2002   Venezuela*  1995-2002 
France  1995-2002   Netherlands  1995-2002   Vietnam  1995-2002 
Gabon  1995-2002   Netherlands  Antilles  1995-2002   Yemen  1995-2002 
Gambia, The  1995-2002   New  Zealand  1995-2002   Zambia  1995-2002 
Georgia**  1995-2002   Nicaragua*  1995-2002   Zimbabwe  1995-2002 
Germany  1995-2002   Niger  1995-2002      
Note:  (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes Transition countries. Source: BIS.  
Table A4. External debt data: Countries and periods covered 
 
Country Period  covered    Country Period  covered 
Algeria 1993-1994    Korea  1993-2001 
Argentina* 1993-2001    Latvia**  1997-2001 
Aruba (1)  1994-2001    Lebanon  1995-2001 
Australia 1993-2001    Liberia  (1)  1997-2000 
Austria 1993-2001    Lithuania**  1995-2001 
Bahrain 1993-2001    Luxembourg  1993-2001 
Barbados* 1993-2000    Malaysia  1993-2001 
Belgium 1993-2001    Malta  1994-2001 
Bolivia* 1994   Mauritius  1995-2001 
Brazil* 1993-2001    México*  1993-2001 
Bulgaria** 1993-2001    Moldova** 1997-2001 
Canada 1993-2001    Morocco  1993-2001 
Chile* 1993-2001    Netherlands  1993-2001 
China: Mainland  1990-2001    Netherlands Ant.*  1993-2001 
China:Hong Kong  1993-2001    New Zealand  1993-2001 
Colombia* 1993-2001    Nicaragua* 1993-2001 
Costa Rica*  1993-2001    Norway  1993-2001 
Croatia** 1997-2001    Oman  1993-2001 
Cyprus 1993-2001    Pakistan  1993-2001 
Czech Republic**  1993-2001    Panama*  1993-2001 
Denmark  1993-2001    Papua New Guinea  1994-1999 
Dominican Rep.*  1997-2001    Peru*  1994-2001 
Ecuador* 1993-2001    Philippines  1993-2001 
Egypt 2001    Poland**  1994-2001 
Estonia** 1996-2001    Portugal  1993-2001 
Finland 1993-2001    Qatar  1996-2001 
France 1993-2001    Romania**  1993-2001 
Germany 1993-2001    Russia** 1993-2001 
Greece 1993-2001    Singapore  1993-2001 
Guatemala* 1993-2001    Slovak  Republic**  1994-2001 
Haití* 1993-1994    Slovenia**  1997-2001 
Hungary** 1993-2001    South  Africa  1993-2001 
Iceland 1993-2001    Spain  1993-2001 
India 1993-2001   Sri  Lanka  1997-2001 
Indonesia 1993-2001    Sweden  1993-2001 
Ireland 1993-2001    Switzerland  1993-2001 
Israel 1993-2001   Thailand  1993-2001 
Italy 1993-2001    Tunisia  1993-2001 
Jamaica* 1996-2001    Turkey  1993-2001 
Japan 1993-2001   United  Kingdom  1993-2001 
Jordan 1993-2001    United  States  1993-2001 
Kazakhstan** 1996-2001    Uruguay*  1993-2001 
Kenya 1997    Venezuela*  1993-2001 
     Zimbabwe  1994 
Notes:   (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes Transition countries. 
(1)  Countries without GDP data, thus not included in the sample.  
Source: BIS.  
   Table A5. Long-term debt with official creditors: Countries and periods covered 
Country  Period 
covered 
  Country  Period 
covered 
  Country  Period 
covered 
Albania**  1990-2000   Guinea-Bissau  1970-2000    Sao Tome & Principe  1971-2000 
Algeria  1970-2000   Guyana*  1970-2000   Senegal  1970-2000 
Angola  1981-2000   Haiti*  1970-2000   Seychelles  1971-2000 
Argentina*  1970-2000   Honduras*  1970-2000   Sierra  Leone  1970-2000 
Armenia**  1993-2000   Hungary**  1971-2000   Slovak  Republic**  1981-2000 
Azerbaijan**  1993-2000   India  1970-2000   Solomon  Islands  1971-2000 
Bangladesh  1971-2000   Indonesia  1970-2000   Somalia  1970-2000 
Belarus**  1993-2000    Iran, I.R. of  1971-2000   South  Africa  1994-2000 
Belize*  1970-2000   Jamaica*  1970-2000   Sri  Lanka  1970-2000 
Benin  1970-2000   Jordan  1970-2000    St. Kitts and Nevis*  1981-2000 
Bhutan  1981-2000   Kazakhstan**  1992-2000   St.  Lucia*  1970-2000 
Bolivia*  1970-2000   Kenya  1970-2000    St. Vincent & Grens.*  1970-2000 
Bosnia and Herzegovina**  1999-2000   Korea  1970-2000   Sudan  1970-2000 
Botswana  1970-2000   Kyrgyz  Republic**  1970-2000   Swaziland  1970-2000 
Brazil*  1970-2000    Lao People's Dem. Rep  1970-2000    Syrian Arab Republic  1970-2000 
Bulgaria**  1981-2000   Latvia**  1992-2000   Tajikistan**  1992-2000 
Burkina Faso  1970-2000   Lebanon  1970-2000   Tanzania  1970-2000 
Burundi  1970-2000   Lesotho  1970-2000   Thailand  1970-2000 
Cambodia  1981-2000   Liberia  1970-2000   Togo  1970-2000 
Cameroon  1970-2000   Lithuania**  1992-2000   Tonga  1981-2000 
Cape Verde  1981-2000   Macedonia,  FYR**  1993-2000    Trinidad & Tobago*  1970-2000 
Central African Republic  1970-2000   Madagascar  1970-2000   Tunisia  1970-2000 
Chad  1970-2000   Malawi  1970-2000   Turkey  1970-2000 
Chile*  1970-2000   Malaysia  1970-2000   Turkmenistán**  1993-2000 
China:  Mainland  1981-2000   Maldives  1971-2000   Uganda  1970-2000 
Colombia*  1970-2000   Mali  1970-2000   Ukraine**  1992-2000 
Comoros  1970-2000   Mauritania  1970-2000   Uruguay*  1970-2000 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   1970-2000   Mauritius  1970-2000   Uzbekistán**  1992-2000 
Congo, Republic of  1970-2000   Mexico*  1970-2000   Vanuatu  1971-2000 
Costa Rica*  1970-2000   Moldova**  1992-2000   Venezuela*  1970-2000 
Cote D'Ivoire  1970-2000   Mongolia**  1993-2000   Vietnam  1981-2000 
Croatia**  1993-2000   Morocco  1970-2000   Yemen  1971-2000 
Czech Republic**  1981-2000   Mozambique  1981-2000   Zambia  1970-2000 
Djibouti  1970-2000   Myanmar  1970-2000   Zimbabwe  1970-2000 
Dominica*  1981-2000   Nepal  1970-2000      
Dominican Republic*  1970-2000   Nicaragua*  1970-2000      
Ecuador*  1970-2000   Niger  1970-2000      
Egypt  1970-2000   Nigeria  1970-2000      
El Salvador*  1970-2000   Oman  1971-2000      
Equatorial Guinea  1970-2000   Pakistan  1970-2000      
Estonia**  1992-2000   Panama*  1970-2000      
Ethiopia  1970-2000    Papua New Guinea  1970-2000      
Fiji  1970-2000   Paraguay*  1970-2000      
Gabon  1970-2000   Peru*  1970-2000      
Gambia, The  1970-2000   Philippines  1970-2000      
Georgia**  1992-2000   Poland**  1981-2000      
Ghana  1970-2000   Romania**  1970-2000      
Grenada*  1970-2000   Russia**  1981-2000      
Guatemala*  1970-2000   Rwanda  1970-2000      
Guinea  1970-2000   Samoa  1970-2000      
Note:  (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes Transition countries. Source: Global Development 
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Table A6. Index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents (as of beginning of 2000) 
 
Country  Restrictions Firms  Households  Prior  approval Country  Restrictions Firms  Households  Prior  approval 
Albania 0  .  .  .  Ghana  0  .  .  . 
Angola 0  .  .  .  Greece  0  .  .  . 
Antigua and Barb.  2  1  .  1  Grenada  2  1  1  . 
Argentina 0  .  .  .  Guatemala 5  2  2  1 
Armenia 0  .  .  .  Guinea  0  .  .  . 
Austria 0  .  .  .  Guinea-Bissau  1  .  .  1 
Azerbaijan 0  .  .  .  Haití  1  1  . . 
Bahamas, The  1  .  .  1  Honduras  0  .  .  . 
Bahrain 0  .  .  .  Hungary 1  1  .  . 
Bangladesh 3  1  1  1  Iceland  0  .  . . 
Barbados 3  1  1  1  Indonesia  0  .  .  . 
Belarus 0  .  .  .  Israel  0  .  .  . 
Belice 1  .  .  1  Italy  0  .  .  . 
Bhutan 5  2  2  1  Jamaica 0  .  .  . 
Bolivia 0  .  .  .  Japan  0  .  .  . 
Bosnia and Herzeg.  0  .  .  .  Jordan  0  .  .  . 
Brazil 2  1  1  .  Kazakhstan  0  .  .  . 
Bulgaria 0  .  .  .  Kenya  0  .  .  . 
Cambodia 0  .  .  .  Korea  0  .  .  . 
Cape Verde  1  .  .  1  Kuwait  0  .  .  . 
Chile 0  .  .  .  Kyrgyz  Republic  0  .  .  . 
China: Mainland  2  1  .  1  Lao People’s Dem.  0  .  .  . 
China: Hong Kong  0  .  .  .  Latvia  0  .  .  . 
Colombia 3  1  2  .  Lebanon  0  .  .  . 
Comoros 1  .  .  1  Lithuania  0  .  .  . 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0  .  .  .  Macedonia, FYR  0  .  .  . 
Costa Rica  0  .  .  .  Malawi  2  1  1  . 
Croatia 0  .  .  .  Malaysia  3  .  2  1 
Cyprus 3  1  1  1  Maldives  0  .  .  . 
Czech Republic  0  .  .  .  Malta  3  1  1  1 
Denmark 0  .  .  .  Mauritius  0  .  .  . 
Dominica 4  1  2  1  México  2  1  1  . 
Ecuador 0  .  .  .  Moldova 0  .  .  . 
Egypt 0  .  .  .  Mongolia  0  .  .  . 
El Salvador  0  .  .  .  Mozambique  0  .  .  . 
Estonia 0  .  .  .  Myanmar  3  1  1  1 
Etiopía 4  1  2  1  Netherlands  0  .  .  . 
Finland 0  .  .  .  Netherlands  Antilles  0  .  .  . 
Georgia 0  .  .  .  New  Zealand  0  .  .  .   29
Table A6. Index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents (as of beginning of 2000) 
(cont.) 
 
Country Index  Firms  House-holds  Prior-approval  Country  Index Firms House-holds Prior-approval 
Nicaragua 0  .  .  .  Suriname  0  .  .  . 
Nigeria 1  .  .  1  Sweden  0  .  .  . 
Norway 0  .  .  .  Switzerland  0  .  .  . 
Oman 0  .  .  .  Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0  .  .  . 
Papua New Guinea  1  1  .  .  Tajikistan  0  .  .  . 
Paraguay 0  .  . .  Tanzania  0  .  .  . 
Peru 0  .  .  .  Thailand  4  1  2  1 
Philippines 0  .  .  .  Tonga  4  2  2  . 
Poland 0  .  .  .  Trinidad  &  Tobago  0  .  .  . 
Qatar 0  .  .  .  Turkey  0  .  .  . 
Romania 0  .  . .  Turkmenistán  3  1  1 1 
Russia 0  .  .  .  Uganda 0  .  .  . 
Rwanda 3  1  1  1  Ukraine  1  .  .  1 
Sao Tome & Princ.  0  .  .  .  United Arab E.  0  .  .  . 
Saudi Arabia  0  .  .  .  United Kingdom  0  .  .  . 
Sierra Leone  0  .  .  .  Uruguay  0  .  .  . 
Slovak Republic  1  .  .  1  Uzbekistán  0  .  .  . 
Slovenia 0  .  . .  Vanuatu  0  .  . . 
South Africa  0  .  .  .  Venezuela  0  .  .  . 
Spain 0  .  .  .  Vietnam  2  1  1  . 
St. Kitts and Nevis  3  1  1  1  Yemen  0  .  .  . 
St. Lucia  0  .  .  .  Zambia  0  .  .  . 
St. Vincent & G.  0  .  .  .  Zimbabwe  0  .  .  . 
Sudan 0  .  .  .          
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2001, based on De Nicoló et al. (2003).  
Firms and Households equal 1 if only documented proceeds of exports or remittances can be lodged to the account;  
2 if accounts are not permitted or are limited to a very narrow category of holder. Prior approval equals 1 if required.  
Restrictions is computed as the sum of the remaining three columns. 
 
 
 